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Local Government Law
Kenneth M, Murchison*

The 2002-2003 term produced a typically varied assortment of
Louisiana appellate decisions involving local governments. As
usual, the greatest volume of cases involved tort claims; the
appellate courts decided cases involving negligence,' causation,2
constructive knowledge,3 comparative fault,4 and various immunity
Copyright 2004 by LOuIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
James E. and Betty M. Phillips Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law
Center, Louisiana State University.
1. See, e.g., McGuirev. New Orleans CityPark Improvement Ass'n, 835 So. 2d
416 (La. 2003) (park operator had no duty to provide special warnings to jogger who
was using route that traversed golf course); Pierce v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 836
So. 2d 328 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002) (principal did not negligently supervise students
in connection with blow darts allegedly being shot at others on school grounds);
Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 844 So. 2d 196 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003)
(sheriffs were not liable for failure to close bridge to traffic in absence of proof that
they were aware of the fog and smoke bank on the bridge immediately prior to the
accident); Hutchins v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 844 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 5th Cir.
2003) (sheriffs office breached duty to motorists when it failed to dispatch a deputy
to the intersection with malfunctioning light and when it failed to provide timely notice
to the state department oftransportation); Deleo v. Lafourche Fresh Water Dist., 846
So. 2d 17 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003) (homeowners failed to show water district acted
negligently when it shut down a pumping station after a barge spilled thousands of
gallons of benzene into the Mississippi River).
2. See, e.g., Sacco v. Allred, 845 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003) (officer's
failure to ascertain whether passenger who took over for intoxicated motorist was
carrying a valid driver's license was not the "legal cause" of an accident that occurred
further down the road); Williams v. Housing Auth. ofNew Orleans, 844 So. 2d 1068
(La. App. 4th Cir. 2003) (record supported finding that a defect in wall of public
housing unit was the cause of decedent's death); Louviere v. Louviere, 839 So. 2d 57
(La. App. 1st Cir. 2002) (city police department was not liable for recommendation
of sheriffs deputy who later committed crime spree); Henry v. Parish of Jefferson,
835 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2002) (shootings at parish recreation center were
not reasonably foreseeable so as to impose duty on parish to provide security for party
at the center); Adams v. Traina, 830 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2002) (whether
town's negligent inspection and licensing of business was cause in fact of injury to
plaintiff in parking lot outside nightclub was a question for the jury).
3. See, e.g., Joseph v. City ofNew Orleans, 842 So. 2d 420 (La. App. 4th Cir.
2003) (city had constructive knowledge of the defect in sidewalk where the defective
condition had remained virtually unchanged for more than two years); Whitaker v.
City of Bossier City, 813 So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2002) (failure to respond to
complaints about weeds in easement did not create constructive knowledge of small
hole located in the easement).
4. See, e.g., Petre v. State, 817 So. 2d 1107 (La. 2002) (evidence supported
finding that state was 50 percent at fault for unreasonable condition of road in singlecar accident involving an intoxicated driver); Williams v. City of Baton Rouge, 844
So. 2d 360 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003) (trial court's allocation of 40 percent of fault for
accident resulting from defective sidewalk was not clearly erroneous); Ashmore v.
*
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defenses. 5 Cases involving civil service 6 and teacher tenure7 also
Hilton, 834 So. 2d 1131 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2002) (city was 70 percent at fault and
inmate-trustee working for city was 30 percent at fault for rape); Capone v. Ormet
Corp., 822 So. 2d 684 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002) (evidence supported finding that
driver's negligence was the sole cause of accident in which vehicle slid off road and
collided with steel I-beam); Nyquist v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 821 So. 2d
39 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2002) (trial court's finding that conduct of pedestrian was sole
cause of accident was not manifest error); Johnson v. Dumas, 811 So. 2d 1085 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 2002) (evidence justified allocation of 80 percent of fault to state and 20
percent to school bus driver in accident in which bus overturned); cf Ferrouillet v.
State, 836 So. 2d 686 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003) (state was not liable for damages
resulting from accident caused solely by motorist who drove the wrong way on
highway exit ramp).
5. See, e.g., Johnson v. Foti, 844 So. 2d 1050 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003) (statute
immunizing individuals who were following instructions of a physician did not apply
to employees of sheriffs department who were transporting inmate to hospital);
Tasker v. City of New Orleans, 834 So. 2d 521 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2002)
(discretionary function immunity did notapply to injury volunteer sustained as he was
helping emergency medical technicians lift and carry his 300-pound neighbor from his
house into an ambulance); Hontex Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Westwego, 833 So. 2d
1234 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2002) (decision to close gap in levee and to build ring levee
around pump was a discretionary act for which public officials were not liable in tort);
Matthews v. Maddie, 822 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002) (statute limiting liability
to actions that involved reckless disregard for the safety of others applied to driver of
emergency rescue vehicle); Saine v. City of Scott, 819 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 3d Cir.
2002) (police officer was not entitled to official immunity in negligence suit brought
by arrestee who alleged that he was injured because handcuffs were too tight); cf
Gregor v. Argenot Great Central Ins. Co., 851 So. 2d 959 (La. 2003) (state health
department is not entitled to discretionary function immunity for failure to enforce the
state sanitary code).
6. See, e.g., Slowinski v. England Econ. & Indus. Dev. Dist., 828 So. 2d 520
(La. 2002) (district was not required to participate in state civil service because it was
an autonomous unit of local government, not a state instrumentality); Evans v.
DeRidder Municipal Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 815 So. 2d 61 (La. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1108, 123 S. Ct. 884 (2003) (civil service board could consider
results of lie detector test in deciding whether to dismiss officer); Howard v. West
Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 843 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003) (school board's
elimination ofauto mechanic course taught by teacher as part of reduction in force was
bona fide exercise of discretion by board even though decision occurred after
Louisiana Supreme Court ordered that teacher be reinstated to his former position);
City of Baton Rouge v. Bernard, 840 So. 2d 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003) (court of
appeal lacked jurisdiction over city's appeal of city personnel board decision to
reinstate employee the city had terminated); Cotrell v. Division of Hous. &
Neighborhood Dev., 830 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2002) (court ofappeal lacked
jurisdiction to hear appeal of commission decision that employees were unlawfully
transferred from one appointing authority to another because the appeal did not
involve a disciplinary action or discrimination); Walker v. City of Opelousas, 817 So.
2d 1258 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2002) (mayor could not abolish executive secretary position
without the approval ofthe civil service board); cf Turner v. Dep't of Transp. & Dev.,
822 So. 2d 786 (La. App. Ist Cir. 2002) (statepolice officer was not entitled to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination in civil service discharge proceeding).
7. See, e.g., Adams v. St. John the Baptist Parish Sch. Bd., 833 So. 2d 571 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 2002) (tenured high school teacher who was diagnosed with serious
psychological problem and was approved for one year unpaid leave and then accepted
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produced a number of appellate decisions, and the term produced an
unusually large group of tax cases.' Other significant decisions
involved the status oflocal governments vis-a-vis the state,9 conflicts
between governmental entities,'" internal procedures," annexation,
rights ofpublic officers, 3 constitutional protections for employees of
one-year teaching job at college did not willfully neglect her duties nor was she
materially dishonest); Bailey v. St. Martin Parish Sch. Bd., 827 So. 2d 1266 (La. App.
3d Cir. 2002) (when school board is presented with a single qualified candidate for
school bus driver, board can decline to select anyone for the position); cf Palmer v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 842 So. 2d 363 (La. 2003)
(state board could not deny renewal of probationary teacher's contract without
superintendent providing reasons for his recommendation of non-renewal because
non-renewal was a "discharge").
8. See, e.g., F. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. Calcasieu Parish Sch. Bd., 838 So. 2d
1269 (La. 2003) (construction contractor was exempt from sales taxes because it was
acting as an agent of port authority); EOP New Orleans, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Tax
Comm'n, 831 So. 2d 1033 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writdenied,831 So. 2d 285 (La. 2002)
(assessor could not increase valuation of property after the list showing assessments
had been completed and made available for inspection by taxpayers); Johnson v.
Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 828 So. 2d 1150 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2002) (assessor lacked
standing to seek review of decision of the tax commission); Kerr-McGee Corp. v.
McNamara, 826 So. 2d 1(La. App. 1st Cir. 2001) (materials, equipment, and supplies
purchased by taxpayer were excluded from sales taxation because they were used in
bona fide interstate commerce when they were consumed in the operation of vessels
in interstate commerce or on taxpayer's platforms beyond the territorial limits of the
state); Johnson v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 822 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002)
(city-not the tax assessor-was the proper party to bring an action for judicial review
of a decision by the Tax Commission); Casey v. Johnson, 821 So. 2d 743 (La. App.
4th Cir. 2002) (taxpayer was notrequired to seek administrative review of assessment
before filing suit to change assessment because property was subject to the Restoration
Tax Abatement Program).
9. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 So.
2d 1098 (La. 2002); Cameron Parish Police Jury v. McKeithen, 836 So. 2d 181 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,828 So. 2d 1106 (La. 2002). For a discussion of these
cases, see notes 39-91 infraand accompanying text.
10. Civil Service Comm'n v. City ofNew Orleans, 839 So. 2d 196 (La. App. 4th
Cit. 2003) (operating agreement under which sheriff's deputies provided security
services to the commission was a "professional or personal service contract" that
required approval of commission).
11. Rogers v. Town of Arcadia, 813 So. 2d 1110 (La. 2002) (budget ordinance
was not sufficiently clear to change the salary of the chief ofpolice).
12. Hollingsworth v. City of Minden, 828 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2002)
(landowners could file a devolutive appeal from a judgment declaring an annexation
reasonable).
13. Lafourche Parish Council v. Breaux, 845 So. 2d 645 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003)
(no statutory or contractual basis existed for awarding parish council president
attorney fees for defending petition to enjoin him from unilaterally awarding contracts
for road construction without council approval); Hoag v. State ex rel. Kennedy, 836
So. 2d 207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002) (statute imposed mandatory obligation on state to
pay extra compensation to coroners); Parish of Caddo v. Durham, 817 So. 2d 1173
(La. App. 2d Cit. 2002) (ordinance that provided for reimbursement of legal fees
incurred by parish officials did not apply to criminal proceedings).
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local governments, 14 ethics, 5 zoning,16 public contracts, 7 the open
meetings law,' 8 and the public records law. 9 The discussion below
14. Moore v. Ware, 839 So. 2d 940 (La. 2003) (officer who was passed over for
promotion because of failure to pass physical fitness test was not denied due process).
The reported decisions of the federal courts of appeal provide a steady stream of
constitutional claims by local employees. See, e.g., Hobler v. Brueher, 325 F.3d 1145
(9th Cir. 2003) (political loyalty of county prosecutor's confidential secretaries is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the prosecutor's office);
Arndt v. Koby, 309 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2002), cert.denied, 123 S. Ct. 1936 (2003)
(police department gag order that barred detective from publicly responding to
allegedly false media statements about her handling of widely publicized murder
investigation did not violate detective's First Amendment right to speak publicly on
matter of public concern); Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2003)
(public employer's retaliatory acts against an employee for engaging in protected
speech violate the First Amendment ifthey are reasonably likely to deter the employee
from engaging in protected activity regardless ofwhether the retaliation involves loss
of valuable government benefits or privileges); Rose v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917 (6th
Cir. 2002) (government employee in a policymaking or confidential position may be
terminated for speech related to his political or policy views as well as for his political
affiliation); Cockrel v. Shelby Cy Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 813, 123 S. Ct. 73 (2002) (teacher's decision to bring to class
speakers advocating environmental benefits of industrial hemp was speech on a matter
of public concern for which teacher could not be fired).
15. State Bd. of Ethics v. Ourso, 842 So. 2d 346 (La. 2003) (respondent can
waive one-year limit for filing an enforcement action under the Campaign Finance
Disclosure Act because it is prescriptive rather than peremptive); Ward v. Louisiana
Bd. of Ethics, 830 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 829 So. 2d 414 (La.
2002) (decision of ethics board to close a file is not an appealable decision);
Northshore Capital Enter. v. St. Tammany Hosp. Dist. # 2, 822 So. 2d 109 (La. App.
Ist Cir.), writdenied,828 So. 2d 584 (La. 2002) (Code ofGovernmental Ethics barred
suit because plaintiff's president was a hospital employee).
16. Cerminaro v. Jefferson Parish Zoning Appeals Bd., 838 So. 2d 193 (La. App.
5th Cir. 2003) (evidence was sufficient to support finding that board's decision to deny
property owner's request to keep the wooden fence in his front yard was not arbitrary
or capricious); Seal v. Dunharn, 836 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002) (because
property owner's home was constructed prior to construction of workshop, zoning
prohibition against constructing accessory building unless dwelling was completed or
under construction did not apply); Ostarly v. Zoning Appeals Bd., 830 So. 2d 542 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 2002) (parish attorney had authority to enter into a consent judgment
binding the zoning appeal board).
17. Tiger Air & Heating, LLC v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 832 So. 2d 324 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 2002) (contract for operation and maintenance ofheating, ventilation,
and air conditioning systems was not subject to bidding requirements ofthe public bid
laws because it was a service contract rather than a public works contract); State
Machinery & Equipment Sales, Inc. v. Livingston Parish Gravity Drainage Dist. No.
5, 818 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2001) (unsuccessful bidder for lease-purchase of
hydraulic crawler-excavator was entitled to damages that should be measured by the
difference between the selling price and the net cost ofthe excavator).
18. St. Mary Anesthesia Associates, Inc. v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 2, 836 So.
2d 379 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002) (legislature had authority to enact statute providing
broad exclusions from the general right ofpublic access in the case ofhospital service
districts).
19. Dwyer v. Early, 842 So. 2d 1124 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003) (district court had
discretion as to whether to award attorney fees in suit to order production of public
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focuses on the cases involving powers ofparishes and municipalities.
I. POWERS OF PARISHES AND MUNICIPALITIES

Article VI of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 includes a
complicated set of provisions governing the powers of "local
governmental subdivision[s]," a term that covers both parishes and
municipalities.2" Three separate sections define the powers of local
governmental subdivisions,2 and two other sections limit the state
legislature's power over them.22 In addition, Section 9 qualifies the
other provisions by denying certain powers to all local governments
and by preserving the police power of the state.23
The three sections defining the powers of parishes and
municipalities distinguish three types of local governmental
subdivisions that had home rule charters before the adoption of the
1974 Constitution, those that adopt charters after 1974, and "other
local governmental subdivisions." Section 4 provides that home rule
charters adopted prior to 1974 "remain in effect." It also confirms
that parishes and municipalities with such charters "retain the powers,
functions, and duties in effect" when the 1974 Constitution was
adopted "[e]xcept as inconsistent with this constitution." In addition,
Section 4 permits any local government with an existing home rule
charter to exercise the powers and functions granted to other local
governmental subdivisions "ifits charter permits. ,24 Section 5 allows
any parish or municipality to adopt a home rule charter; the charter
may authorize the parish or municipality to exercise any power or
perform "any function necessary, requisite, or proper for the
management of its affairs" so long as the power or function is not
records); Sewell v. Benoit, 841 So. 2d 24 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003) (district court erred
in ordering plaintiff to pay cost of redacting levee district's legal bills to remove
mental impressions of counsel and other privileged information); Local 100 v. Smith,
830 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2002) (school board's release ofhome addresses and
telephone numbers to union was not warranted in light of employees' expectation of
privacy concerning such information); Hilliard v. Litchfield, 822 So. 2d 743 (La. App.
1st Cir. 2002) (prison inmate is entitled to access to public records because he is a
"person" within the meaning of the Public Records Law); cf The Times Picayune
Publ'g Corp. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003) (records
pertaining to settled claims do not fall within the law's exception for "pending
claims").
20. La. Const. art. VI, §44(1). For a summary ofthe provisions of Article VI by
one of the delegates to the constitutional convention that produced the 1974
Constitution, see R. Gordon Kean, Jr., Local GovernmentandHome Rule, 21 Loy. L.
Rev. 63 (1975).
21. La. Const. art. VI, §4, 5, 7.
22. Id. §§ 6, 14.
23. Id. § 9.
24. Id. § 4.
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"denied by general law or inconsistent with this constitution."25
Section 7 governs the powers of "other local governmental
subdivisions;" that is, parishes and municipalities without home rule
charters.26 These local governments may exercise any power or
perform any function granted by law. In addition, they may exercise
any other power or perform any other function not denied by general
law or inconsistent with this constitution if the voters agree that the
local government should have the power or function in an election
called for that purpose.27
Two provisions limit the power of the legislature over local
governments. Section 6 provides a protection that applies only to
parishes and municipalities with home rule charters. It forbids the
legislature from enacting any law that has the effect of interfering
with the "structure and organization or the particular distribution and
redistribution of the powers and functions" of a local governmental
subdivision with a home rule charter.28 Section 14 precludes the
legislature from imposing certain unfunded mandates on any
"political subdivision," a term that includes all local governments, not
just parishes and municipalities. 9 Probably the most important of
these limitations prohibits the legislature from requiring higher pay
for local employees;"0 it, however, is subject to an exception for
police officers and municipal fire fighters, two goups for whom the
legislature has mandated pay scales in the past.

25. Id. §5(E).

26. Id. § 7. The term "Other Governmental Subdivisions" appears only in the
heading of Section 7. The text of the section refers to "a local governmental
subdivision which has no home rule charter or plan or government." Id. § 7(A).
"Subject to uniform procedures established by law," Section 17 specifically grants
every local governmental subdivision authority to "adopt regulations for land use,
zoning, and historic preservation." See St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc. v. Riverboat
Gaming Comm'n, 648 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1995); Palermo Land Co. v. Planning
Comm'n, 561 So. 2d 482 (La. 1990), analyzed in Murchison, Developments in the
Law, 1990-1991-LocalGovernment Law, 52 La. L. Rev. 541, 550-52 (1992).
27. La. Const. art. VI, § 7(A).
28. Id.§6.
29. Id. § 14. Section 44 defines a political subdivision as "a parish, municipality,
and any other unit oflocal government, including a school board and a special district,
authorized by law to perform governmental functions." Id. § 44(2).
30. Id. § 14(B)(5).
31. See, e.g., New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 422 So.
2d 402 (La. 1982); Spillman v. City ofBaton Rouge, 441 So. 2d 1243 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1983), writ denied,446 So. 2d 1213 (La. 1984); Ruby v. City of Shreveport, 427
So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,433 So. 2d 154 (La. 1983); Murchison,
Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-LocalGovernmentLaw, 44 La. L. Rev. 373,
389-401 (1983); Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Local
Government Law, 42 La. L. Rev. 564, 575-79 (1982).
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Finally, Section 9 constricts the powers of all parishes and
municipalities in two important respects and preserves state primacy
in a broad area. Subsection (A) contains the restrictions on local
power. It forbids any "parish or municipality" from defining and
providing for "the punishment of a felony;" and, "except as provided
by law," it bars any local "ordinance governing private or civil
relationships."32 Subsection (B) preserves the primacy of state
regulatory authority, "Notwithstanding any provision of[Article VI],"
it declares that "the police power of the state shall never be
abridged.""
The provisions summarized above have provided a steady stream
of litigation over the last three decades, much ofit involving the city
of New Orleans.34 The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently
recognized the constitutional provisions as conferring broad local
authority to act without express legislative authority. Some decisions
have suggested that local governments with home rule charters
enjoyed considerable immunity from state legislative power,35 but
32. La. Const. art. VI, § 9(A).
33. Id. § 9(B).
34. See, e.g., Morial v. Smith & Wesson, Corp., 785 So. 2d 1(La. 2001); City of
New Orleans v. Bd. ofDirectors of the La. State Museum, 739 So. 2d 748 (La. 1999);
Miller v. Oubre, 682 So. 2d231 (La. 1996); City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 661 So.
2d 445 (La. 1995); St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc. v. Riverboat Gaming Comm'n, 648
So. 2d 1310 (La. 1995); City ofNew Orleans v. Bd. ofComm'rs, 640 So. 2d 237 (La.
1994); Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128 (La. 1993); American Waste & Pollution
Control Co. v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury, 609 So. 2d 201 (La. 1992); Hildebrand
v. City of New Orleans, 549 So. 2d 1218 (La. 1989); City of New Orleans v.
Scramuzza, 507 So. 2d 215 (La. 1987); Francis v. Morial, 455 So. 2d 1168 (La.
1984); City of New Orleans v. State, 426 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1983); New Orleans
Firefighters Ass'n v. City Service Comm'n of the City of New Orleans, 422 So. 2d
402 (La. 1982); ACORN v. City of New Orleans, 407 So. 2d 1225 (La. 1981)
(ACORN II); West v. Allen, 382 So. 2d 924 (La. 1980); ACORN v. City of New
Orleans, 377 So. 2d 1206 (La. 1979) (ACORN I); Rollins Envtl. Services of
Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127 (La. 1979); City of
New Orleans v. State, 364 So. 2d 1020 (La. 1978).
Previous symposia articles
have analyzed several of these decisions. See Murchison, Developments in the Law,
1987-1988-Local Government Law, 49 La. L. Rev. 367, 388-93 (1988) (discussing
Scramuzza); Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-LocalGovernment
Law, 44 La. L. Rev. 373, 389-401 (1983) (discussing New OrleansFirefightersAss 'n
and City ofNew Orleans v. State); Murchison, Recent Developments in the Law,
1981-1982-Local GovernmentLaw, 43 La. L. Rev. 461,474-76 (1982) (discussing
ACORN!); Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980,41 La. L. Rev. 481,
485-500 (1981) (discussing West, A CORN1, andRollins Envt 'lServices);Murchison,
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Local
GovernmentLaw,40 La. L. Rev. 681,706-10 (1980) (discussing City ofNew Orleans
v. State).
35. See, e.g., City ofNew Orleans v. Bd. ofComm'rs, 640 So. 2d 237 (La. 1994)
(city can require levee board to comply with zoning regulations); Hildebrand v. City
of New Orleans, 549 So. 2d 1218 (La. 1989) (city can enact inheritance tax); Francis,
455 So. 2d 1168 (state law changing the membership of the New Orleans Aviation

282

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64

others have favored state authority in cases of conflict between the
state and local governments.36 As early as 1982, the court held that
the exception of police and municipal firefighters from Section 14's
prohibition on unfunded mandates is an express authorization for
state control; thus, it overrides the prohibition in Section 6 against
state laws that change the structure and organization of local
governments with home rule charters." More importantly, the court
has also relied on Section 9(B), which precludes any abridgement of
the police power, to favor the state in cases that involve conflicting
state and local policies.38
Two cases from the 2002-2003 term continue the recent trend of
favoring state power in conflicts with local governments. In New
OrleansCampaignfor a Living Wage v. City ofNew Orleans,39 the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that a state statute prohibiting local
governments from establishing a minimum wage rate invalidated the
city's minimum wage law. In Cameron Parish Police Jury v.
McKeithen,4 ° the first circuit ruled that state law precluded a parish
from establishing gaming activities on any waterway except those
designated under state law.

Board violates Section 6 prohibition against interference with structure and
organization of local government with home rule charter); ACORN v. City of New
Orleans, 407 So. 2d 1225 (La. 1981) (ACORN II) (city had authority to enact a road
use tax on motor vehicles); ACORN v. City of New Orleans, 377 So. 2d 1206 (La.
1979) (ACORN I); (city had authority to enact an annual service charge on all real
property located within the city).
36. See, e.g., City ofNew Orleans v. Scramuzza, 507 So. 2d 215 (La. 1987) (city
"earnings tax" violated constitutional prohibition against local income tax); West v.
Allen, 382 So. 2d 924 (La. 1980) (state constitution required parish firefighters to
become part of state civil service system for firefighters and police officers); Rollins
Envtl. Services of Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127 (La.
1979) (parish police jury lacked authority to regulate hazardous waste); City ofNew
Orleans v. State, 364 So. 2d 1020 (La. 1978) (municipal zoning ordinance could not
control state's use of its property in performing a governmental function).
37. New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n ofthe City ofNew
Orleans, 422 So. 2d 402 (La. 1982).
38. See, e.g., Morial,785 So. 2d 1(state law prohibiting local governments from
suing manufacturers of firearms is a valid exercise of the police power); City of New
Orleans v. Bd. of Directors of the La. State Museum, 739 So. 2d 748 (La. 1999) (city
commission abridged police powers of state by denying zoning permit to state
museum); Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128 (La. 1993) (state legislation authorizing
site for casino was a valid exercise ofthe police power with which the city could not
interfere); cf Louisiana Associated Gen. Contractors v. Calcasieu Parish Sch. Bd., 586
So. 2d 1354 (La. 1991) (holding that a local school board requirement that contractors
pay the "prevailing wage" rate abridged the police power of the state as expressed in
the state law abolishing the prevailing wage requirement for state contracts).
39. 825 So. 2d 1098 (La. 2002).
40. 836 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,828 So. 2d 1106 (La. 2002).
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A. Local Minimum Wage Laws
During the 1990s, urban activists organized "living wage"
campaigns in cities across the United States.4 ' The aim of those
campaigns was to have a local government enact a "living wage"
applicable to the government's own employees as well as to
employees of government contractors and other companies doing
business with the local government. The proposed living wage would
obligate those employers to pay all of their employees a wage higher
than the federal minimum wage law established by the Fair Labor
Standards Act.42
The New Orleans campaign had a much broader focus. 43 It
advocated a local minimum wage law that covered most employees
who performed work within the city of New Orleans. The only
exceptions were employees who were excluded from the federal
minimum wage law, city and state employees whose salaries were
set by a civil service commission, 45 and persons employed on public
works contracts. 46 The minimum wage proposed for New Orleans
was the greater of $6.15 or $1.00 more than the prevailing minimum
wage under federal law.
Opponents of the New Orleans proposal sought state assistance.
In 1997, the legislature responded by enacting La. R.S. 23:642, 47
which prohibited any local government from establishing a local
minimum wage law. Notwithstanding the new statute, the proponents
of a minimum wage for New Orleans continued their campaign. In
September 2001, the City Council proposed the local minimum wage
requirement as an amendment to the city's home rule charter. On
February 2, 2002, the New Orleans electorate approved the proposed
amendment in a referendum.48
Proponents and opponents quickly filed competing suits for
declaratory judgments regarding the amendments. The two cases
41.

See New Orleans Campaignfor a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1121 n.3

(dissenting opinion of Johnson, J.).

42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 etseq. (2000).
43. New Orleans may have adopted the broader approach because of
constitutional concerns over its ability to set wages for civil service employees, see La.
Const. art. X, §§ 1-15 (establishing civil service system for the city of New Orleans),
and for companies who obtain contracts pursuant to the Public Bid Law, see Louisiana
Associated Gen. Contractors, 586 So. 2d 1354 (holding that prohibition on
requirement that contractors pay "prevailing wages" is an exercise ofthe state's police
power).
44. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2000).
45. See La. Const. art. X, §§ 1-15; supranote 43.
46. See LouisianaAssociated Gen. Contractors, 586 So. 2d 1354); supranote
43.
47. 1997 La. Acts, No. 317, § 1 (enacting La. R.S. 23:642).
48. See New Orleans Campaignfor a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1101.
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were consolidated and assigned to Judge Rosemary Ledet of the
Orleans Parish Civil District Court. Following a trial on the merits,
Judge Ledet upheld the validity of the city's minimum wage law.4 9
Opponents of the charter amendment argued it was
unconstitutional for two reasons. First, they claimed that the
minimum wage law provision violated Article VI, Section 9(A)
because it was an "ordinance governing private or civil relationships."
Second, they contended that the charter amendment violated Article
VI, Section 9(B) because it abridged the police power of the state as
expressed in the 1997 statute.50
Judge Ledet rejected both arguments. In her view, the charter
amendment was not an ordinance governing private or civil relations
because it did "conflict with any Louisiana statutory provisions
pertaining to substantive rights, enforcement schemes, or remedies
affecting civil or private relationships, particularly tort, contract and
workers' compensation."'" She also concluded that the amendment
was not an abridgement of the state's police power because the
opponents of the minimum wage law had failed to prove that the
1997 statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power. In
reaching this conclusion, she dismissed as biased the testimony ofthe
expert who had testified in favor ofthe legislation. Instead, she relied
on the testimony on behalf of the proponents of the local minimum
wage requirement.5 "
The Louisiana Supreme Court voted 6-1 to reverse the district
court, but the majority was divided over the rationale for invalidating
the charter amendment. A bare majority of fourjustices held that the
amendment to the New Orleans charter violated Article VI, Section
9(B) because it abridged the state's police power.53 The two
concurring justices-ChiefJustice Calogero"4 and Justice Weimer 5549. In addition to rejecting the constitutional arguments discussed in the text,
Judge Ledet also dismissed the claim that the minimum wage ordinance violated the
city's home rule charter. Relying on the charter's broad authorization for the city to
enact "local police, sanitary and similar regulations," she "concluded that the
minimum wage ordinance [was] a valid exercise of the City's police power." Id. at
1102.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting trial court).
52. Id. at 1106.
53. Id. at 1100.
54. Id. at 1108 (Calogero, C.J., concurring).
Chief Justice Calogero's analysis of whether the city's minimum wage law was an
"ordinance governing private or civil relationships" was brief. "[T]he contract of
labor between an employer and employee is," he asserted, "a private and civil
relationship," and "[t]he city's wage ordinance govern[ed] this private and civil
relationship inasmuch as wages are an essential element of that contract." Id.at 1108
(citing La. Civ. Code art. 2670). Although the city's ordinance took the form of
defining a misdemeanor, its substance mandating "certain wages" belied its "civil
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objectives." Id.; cf.id. at 1109 n.1(citing Javers v. Council of City of New Orleans,
351 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977)). Thus, he indicated his agreement with
Justice Weimer's longer analysis arguing that "the wage ordinance [was] an unlawful
attempt by the city to govern private or civil relationships, an area expressly reserved
to the State by Article VI, § 9(A)." New OrleansCampaignfor a Living Wage, 825
So. 2d at 1109.
The bulk of Justice Calogero's concurrence explained his rejection of the majority's
analysis of the police power issue. On this point, he reiterated the position that he had
articulated two years earlier in dissenting from a decision that upheld-as a valid
exercise of the police power-a state statute precluding local governments from filing
suits against manufacturers of firearms. See Morial,785 So. 2d 1,20 (Calogero, C.J.,
dissenting).
According to Chief Justice Calogero, City of New Orleans v. Board of
Commissioners, 640 So. 2d 237 (La. 1994) established the appropriate analytical
framework. It imposed on the courts "the constitutional duty to determine whether an
act of the legislature pursuant to its police powers" is a matter of "true 'statewide'
concern." New Orleans Campaignfor a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1109. To
discharge that duty, the courts "must do more than merely rely on the legislature's
pronouncement." Id. at 1110. Rather, the trial court must develop "a record... from
which tojudge the reasonableness ofthe legislature's decision to pre-empt an area that
might otherwise be adequately handled on the local government level," and the court
must give that record "careful scrutiny." Id.
In New OrleansCampaignfor a Living Wage, the chief justice argued, the trial
court developed an appropriate record with respect to the minimum wage law.
Applying the "careful scrutiny" standard, he was "not convinced that a uniform wage
throughout the state [was] necessary to prevent an evil frombefalling the people of the
State of Louisiana." Id. To support this conclusion, he relied on the federal minimum
wage law, 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2000). That statute authorizes state or local
governments to establish minimum wages higher than the federal standard. It thus
contains "an inferential finding by Congress that a uniform minimum wage is not
necessary to prevent an evil from befalling the people of the United States, much less
the people of Louisiana." Id.
55. New OrleansCampaignfor a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1111 (Weimer, J,
concurring).
Justice Weimer's concurrence avoided the police power issue altogether. Because
he concluded that the New Orleans charter amendment violated Article VI, § 9(A) as
an ordinance govering private or civil relationships, he found it unnecessary to reach
the issue that divided the majority and Chief Justice Calogero, "whether the state's
police power trumps that of the city of New Orleans" under Article VI, § 9(B). Id.
Justice Weimer preceded his analysis with a paragraph emphasizing that the court
was not deciding if a minimum wage law for the city was "wise or prudent." Id.; see
alsoid. at 1120. The judicial role was "more limited." Because the city and the state
had "enacted diametrically different regulations regarding the same subject matter,"
the court had to decide which governmental entity had "exceeded the boundaries of
its constitutional authority." Id. at 1111.
To make that decision, Justice Weimer began by summarizing the city's power
under its home rule charter. The city charter predated the 1974 Constitution, and so
Article VI, §4 "continued, and essentially constitutionalized," the charter, giving the
city a "continuing claim to the utmost powers" available under the state constitution.
Moreover, the charter itself confirmed those powers by including two broad provisions
that claimed for the city all the powers that local governments are authorized to
exercise under state law. Together, the constitution and the charter allow the city of
New Orleans to exercise "any legislative power that is not inconsistent with the 1974
constitution." Id. at 1112.
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argued that the amendment was constitutionally defective not because
it abridged the state's police power but because it governed private or
civil relationships in violation of Section 9(A). Justice Johnson
Because "[t]he power to enact minimum wage legislation is an exercise ofthe police
power," the "powers of initiation" conveyed by Article VI, Section 4 and the charter
were "broad enough standing alone" to authorize the city to enact the legislation.
However, Section 4 did not stand alone because Section 9 "withholds part of the
authority conveyed by Section 4." Specifically, Section 9(A) prohibits any local
government from enacting "any ordinance governing private or civil relationships"
unless the legislature has otherwise "provided by law." Thus, "the question that
present[ed] itself' was whether the city minimum wage law was "inconsistent" with
the constitution because it conflicted with the prohibition in Section 9(A) against any
local ordinance "governing private or civil relationships." Id. at 1113.
Justice Weimer conceded that the exact parameters ofthe Section 9(A) prohibition
were not "precise." Id. To give a more definite meaning to the phrase, he reviewed
the national model on which Section 9 was based, the debates of the constitutional
convention at which the section was drafted, judicial decisions in Louisiana and other
states, and the plain meaning ofthe text.
Since Louisiana borrowed the language of Section 9 from the Model State
Constitution of the National Municipal League, Justice Weimer examined national
commentaries to determine the meaning of the phrase "private or civil relationships."
That examination led him to the conclusion that the drafters intended the phrase to be
"a legislative recognition of the fact that laws governing relationships between private
entities are more properly the subject ofstatewide legislation which would produce a
desired uniformity in treatment of such interests than municipal legislation which
could result in an endless variety or private law." Id.
The "drafting history" of Louisiana's constitution convinced Justice Weimer that
Section 9(A) had the same purpose. Although the debates left the exact parameters
of Section 9 "deliberately imprecise," Justice Weimer discerned a "clear" general
intent. Id. at 1114. Adoption of the national model, he argued, showed that the
drafters wanted "to preserve the traditional understanding... that local government
is not empowered to make law in the private arena due to the overriding need for
consistency, predictability, and uniformity in the regulation of such relationships." Id.
Justice Weimer next argued that his interpretation was consistent with prior judicial
decisions in Louisiana and elsewhere. Javers v. Council, 351 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1977) had indicated that a New Orleans rent-control ordinance violated Section
9(A) because its provisions regulated the private civil relationship involved in
residential leases. New OrleansCampaign or a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1115.
By contrast, Hildebrand v. City of New Orleans, 549 So. 2d 1218 (La. 1989),
sustained a municipal inheritance tax because it did not alter "the private civil
relationships between the owner of property and his heirs or legatees." New Orleans
CampaignforaLiving Wage,825 So. 2d at 1116. Massachusetts decisions construing
an identical provision in its constitution reached similar results, invalidating a rentreview board but sustaining a local human-rights commission. Id. (citing Marshall
House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd., 260 N.E.2d 200 (Mass. 1970); Bloom
v. City of Worcester, 293 N.E.2d 268 (Mass. 1973).
Finally, Justice Weimer relied on "the plain meaning ofthe words" in Section 9(A)
to buttress his conclusion. New OrleansCampaignfor a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at
1117. Using definitions from Black's Law Dictionary, he contended that "the
employment relationship is both a private relationship and a civil relationship." Id.
It qualified as a "private relationship because the parties to the relationship ... are
private individuals." Id. In addition, it was "a civil relationship because it is a
relationship established by the civil law: the employment agreement is a species of
lease governed by Title IX ofthe Civil Code." Id.
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dissented; she contended that the amendment was a permissible
exercise of the city's home rule powers.5 6
The clash between the statute and the amendment of the city's
home rule charter was unmistakable. The state law prohibits any
"local governmental subdivision" from establishing "a minimum
wage rate which a private employer would be required to pay
employees." 57 The charter amendment approved by the voters in
2002 required most private employers to pay employees performing
work in New Orleans a wage at least $1.00 higher than the federal
minimum wage rate.5 8 Justice Kimball's majority opinion relied on
this conflict as the basis for her conclusion that the charter
amendment was an unconstitutional abridgement ofthe state's police
power.
Justice Kimball began her analysis with a broad definition of the
police power. Relying on earlier home rule cases, she defined the
police power as "the state's inherent power to govern persons and
things, within constitutional limits, for promotion of general health,
safety, welfare, and morals."5 9 Although a police power measure
must be "reasonable," she defined that standard as a minimal one. It
requires only that the measure be "one in which the action taken is,
under all the circumstances, reasonably necessary and designed to
accomplish a purpose properly falling within the scope of the police
56. Id. at 1120 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Justice Johnson's analysis quoted
extensively from the court's prior decisions in City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 661
So. 2d 445 (La. 1995); City ofNew Orleans v. Bd. ofComm'rs, 640 So. 2d 237 (La.
1994);Francis,455 So. 2d 1168. New OrleansCampaignfora Living Wage, 825 So.
2d at 1122-23. That "long line ofjurisprudence," she argued, "recognized the right
of home rule entities to regulate their affairs with minimum interference from state
government, limited only by the police power of the state which shall never be
abridged." Id. at 1123. It also established that the state's legislative power did not
include "unqualified power to withdraw, preempt, or overrule a local law." Id.
(emphasis in original).
According to Justice Johnson, the New Orleans Levee Board case established the
appropriate test when the legislature relied on the state's police power to invalidate a
local ordinance. In such cases, the court had to answer two questions: Does the state
law "protect a vital or compelling state interest," and [i]f so, can that state interest be
achieved through less drastic alternatives?" New Orleans Campaignfor a Living
Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1124.
In Justice Johnson's view, the district court appropriately relied on the trial evidence
to answer these questions, and Justice Johnson's own review of the evidence
convinced her that La. R.S. 23:642 was invalid. "[N]o empirical evidence" supported
the state's claim "that a variation in the minimum wage would be detrimental to the
State's interests," and the plaintiffs presented "overwhelming evidence to the
contrary." Thus, the state had "failed to show that La. R.S. 23:642 is 'necessary' to
protect the vital interest of the state as a whole." Id. at 1124-25.
57. La. R.S. 23:642 (1997).
58. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
59. New OrleansCampaignfor a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d. at 1104.
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power., 60 If a police power measure is reasonable, it must still satisfy
two other requirements. First, the operation ofthe measure must tend
"in some degreeto prevent an offense or evil or otherwise to preserve
public health, safety, welfare, or morals." Second, "the state's
exercise of its police power must not interfere with constitutional
rights to an extent that is 61
entirely out of proportion to any benefit
redounding to the public."
Having articulated the applicable standard, Justice Kimball turned
to La. R.S. 23:642.62 In Subsection A, the legislature found that
"local variation in minimum wage rates would be detrimental to the
business environment of the state and to its citizens, businesses, local
governments, and the local labor market." It also "found that
statewide regulation of minimum wage rates is required
to preserve
63
the general welfare of the citizens of Louisiana.
Turning from the text of the legislation to the information before
the legislature when it enacted the statute, Justice Kimball
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. La. R.S. 23:642 provides:
A. (1) The Legislature of Louisiana finds that economic stability and growth
are among the most important factors affecting the general welfare of the
people of this state and are, therefore, among its own most important
responsibilities. Economic stability and growth contribute to the standard of
living enjoyed by citizens as employment and income are both dependent on
the ability and willingness of businesses to operate in the state.
(2) The legislature further finds that wages comprise the most significant
expense of operating a business. It also recognizes that neither potential
employees nor business patrons are likely to restrict themselves to
employment opportunities or goods and services providers in any particular
parish or municipality. Consequently, local variation in legally required
minimum wage rates would threaten many businesses with a loss of
employees to areas which require a higher minimum wage rate and many
other businesses with the loss of patrons to areas which allow for a lower
wage rate. The net effect of this situation would be detrimental to the
business environment of the state and to the citizens, businesses, and
governments of the various local jurisdictions as well as the local labor
market.
(3) The legislature concludes from these findings that, in order for a business
to remain competitive and yet to attract and retain the highest possible
caliber of employees, and thereby to remain sound, an enterprise must work
in a uniform environment with respect to minimum wage rates. The net
impact of local variation in mandated wages would be economic instability
and decline and a decrease in the standard of living for the citizens of the
state. Consequently, decisions regarding minimum wage policy must be
made by the state so that consistency in the wage market is preserved.
B. Therefore, pursuant to the police powers ultimately reserved to the state
by Article VI, Section 9 of the Constitution of Louisiana, no local
governmental subdivision shall establish a minimum wage rate which a
private employer would be required to pay employees.
63. New Orleans Campaignfor a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1105.

2004

KENNETHM MURCHISON

emphasized that "the legislative history of the statute" supported
these findings. The Dean of the College ofBusiness Administration
at the University of New Orleans appeared before the House
Committee on Labor and Industry when it considered the bill that
became La. R.S. 23:642. He testified that "the latest wage survey
conducted in 1990-1991 showed that unemployment increased after
an increase in the federal minimum wage." In addition, various other
individuals who testified "in favor of [La. R.S. 23:642] opined that
higher minimum wage requirements would be detrimental to their
businesses and to small businesses and would lead to layoffs."
This evidence convinced Justice Kimball that La. R.S. 23:642 was
a valid exercise of the police power of the state. By "enacting La.
R.S. 23:642, the legislature determined the policy of the state of
Louisiana with respect to minimum wage requirements." This
determination "prescribed that minimum wage policy decisions
should be made by the state to preserve consistency in the wage
market," and "mak[ing] such policy determinations" for the state is
"the role of the legislature." Moreover, the evidence on which the
legislature relied in making this determination- "the expert opinion
of a local economist and the opinions of citizens and local
businesses"--is "precisely" the type of evidence "the legislature
should consider in setting statewide policy." In light of"the opinions
that "the legislature's policy
presented," the majority concluded
65
choice [was] a reasonable one."
At the trial before the district court, supporters of the local
minimum wage law offered the testimony of two expert economists.
They "voiced disagreement with the findings of the legislature...
and with the expert testimony of [the Dean ofthe College ofBusiness
Administration at the University ofNew Orleans]." The district court
dismissed the dean's testimony as "biased" and accepted as "more
compelling" the testimony of the experts who testified in support of
the city's minimum wage law. "In reaching this conclusion," the
Louisiana Supreme Court majority declared, "the district court
overstepped its role." When it chose "to give the evidence presented
by one side more weight than that presented by the other, the district
court improperly second-guessed the reasoned policy choice of the
legislature." By so doing, the lower court exceeded its proper role of
"evaluat[ing] whether the legislature's policy choice was reasonable
66
in light of the evidence presented.
64. Id. at 1105-06 (citing La. House Committee on Labor and Industrial
Relations, Minutes for April 25, 1997, at 15-18). Opponents of the measure derided
the economic data as "garbage" and said "people were moving out ofNew Orleans
because they could not make enough money." Id. at 1106.

65. Id.

66. Id.
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Justice Kimball emphasized that judicial review was not a rubber
stamp for legislation purportedly based on the police power: "[T]he
judicial branch must ensure that the legislature's actions comport with
the dictates ofthe constitution as adopted by the people ofthis state."
Thus, a legislative assertion that "an action was taken pursuant to the
police power ofthe state does not make it so." The courts must still
"determine whether an action is a reasonable exercise of the state's
police power." Although "the legislature's determination regarding
the exercise of police power must be given great weight," the
judiciary must decide "whether there is support for the legislative
determination."67
Justice Kimball then applied this analytical framework to La. R.S.
23:642. She began by noting that a 1991 decision had already "found
that 'the power to set and [to] prescribe a minimum wage is regarded
as an exercise of the police power because a minimum wage is
generally intended to insure employment at fair and reasonable wages
and to stimulate the economy."' 68 She then articulated three
additional findings to support the conclusion that La. R.S. 23:642 was
"a reasonable exercise ofthe police power." First, the majority found
"that state regulation ofminimum wage rates is ofvital interest to the
citizens ofLouisiana and that statewide regulation ofminimum wage
rates tends to preserve the public welfare." Second, the majority
found the state legislation "reasonably necessary" in light of the
legislative policy "that minimum wage policy decisions should be
made by the state to preserve consistency in the wage market." The
legislation was thus "designed to promote economic stability and
growth of the state, and thereby to promote the welfare of
Louisianans." Third, the majority found that "the provisions of La.
R.S. 23:642" were "necessary to protect the vital interest of the state

67. Id. at 1106-07. At trial, "the district court was apparently persuaded by the
'empirical data' presented" by the supporters ofthe minimum wage ordinance. Id. at
1107. Although that evidence tended to show that the increase in the minimum wage
would not negatively impact the economy ofNew Orleans, Justice Kimball concluded
that it was "irrelevant" to the inquiry before the court. Id. "The issue to be decided"
was not the impact of the city's minimum wage but "whether the state can prohibit all
local governments from regulating minimum wage rates pursuant to a reasonable
exercise of the police power." Id. That a particular local minimum wage would not
cause harm to the local economy did not answer the "relevant inquiry": "whether the
legislature was reasonable in concluding that it would be detrimental to the state's
interest if several municipalities increased their minimum wages." Id.
68. Id.(citingLouisianaAssoc. Gen. Contractors,586 So. 2d 1354, 1366). For
a contemporary analysis suggesting that the rationale of CalcasieuParishwould also
apply to local governments with home rule charters, see Murchison, Developments in
the Law, 1991-1992-LocalGovernmentLaw, 53 La. L. Rev. 823, 849 (1993).
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as a whole and [did] not constitute such an interference with the
City's constitutional rights that the statute must be held unenforceable
against the City."69
The conclusion that La. R.S. 23:642 was a reasonable exercise of
the police power effectively determined the validity of the
amendment to the city's home rule charter. As noted above, the city's
minimum wage law directly conflicted with the state statute because
it set "a minimum wage private employers are required to pay their
employees." Thus, the charter amendment "abridge[d] the police
power of the state in violation of Article VI, § 9(B) of the Louisiana
Constitution" and was "invalid."7
Opponents of the charter amendment also argued that the
amendment was an unconstitutional "ordinance governing private or
civil relationships" in violation of Article VI, § 9(A) ofthe Louisiana
Constitution. Justice Kimball declined to reach that issue in light of
the majority's ruling that the city's minimum wage law was an
unconstitutional abridgement ofthe state's police power under Article
VI, Section 9(B).7
New Orleans Campaignfor a Living Wage is consistent with the
general pattern ofthe Louisiana Supreme Court's decisions regarding
the scope of the state's police power. When state regulatory
legislation directly conflicts with a local ordinance on the same
subject, the court has generally invalidated the local ordinance as an
abridgement ofthe state's police power.72 One can only identify two
clear exceptions to this pattern. Francisv. Morial" invalidated a
state law that tried to change the membership of the New Orleans
Aviation Board, and City of New Orleans v. Board of
Commissioners74 held that the city's application of its zoning
ordinances to a marina that the New Orleans Levee Board planned to
build did not abridge the state's police power.
Francisis easily distinguishable from the other police power
cases. The state law involved in Francismandated a reorganization
of the city's airport board, and Article VI, Section 6 expressly
prohibits state laws affecting the "reorganization" of a local
government with a home rule charter. Extending the police power
provision of Section 9 to cover the legislation involved in Francis
would thus have rendered Section 6 a virtual nullity.

69. New Orleans Campaignfor a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1107-08.
70. Id.at 1108.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Morial,785 So. 2d 1; City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Directors, 739
So. 2d 748 (La. 1999); Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128 (La. 1993).
73. 455 So. 2d 1168 (La. 1984).
74. 640 So. 2d 237 (La. 1994).
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One can also distinguish the New Orleans Levee Board case from
most ofthe other recent police power cases. The decisions upholding
the gaming laws,75 the prohibition against local governments filing
suits against manufacturers of firearms, 7 6 and the ban on local
municipal wage laws involved in New Orleans Campaignfor a
Living Wage all involved state laws directly addressing a
controversial policy issue." In each case, the Louisiana Supreme
Court sided with the state. By contrast, the New Orleans Levee Board
case involved a decision by a state agency that served a
geographically limited area; moreover, the agency was exercising its
general mission, not carrying out a specific project mandated by the
legislature. In the levee board case, the court understandably sided
with the general governmental entity for the area, especially since that
government operated pursuant to a home rule charter.
The factual distinctions between the New Orleans Levee Board
case and other recent police power decisions should not, however,
obscure the shift in analysis that one can observe in the more recent
cases. As Chief Justice Calogero correctly notes in his concurring
opinion,7" the court was far more deferential to the legislature in the
firearm-lawsuit case and the minimum wage case than it was in the
levee board decision. In the levee board opinion, the court engaged
in a very careful scrutiny of the state's claim that the local ordinance
would abridge the police power. It required the litigant challenging
the local law to show a conflict between the local ordinance and "an
act of the legislature that is necessaryto protect the vital interest of
the state as a whole."7 9 Moreover, the court declared, to prove that
the state statute is "necessary" to protect a vital state interest, the
party relying on the state law had to establish "that the protection of
such state interest cannot be achieved through alternate means
significantly less detrimental to home rule powers and rights.""° By
contrast, the court showed much more deference to the legislature
with respect to the statutes prohibiting local suits against firearms
manufacturers and ordinances establishing local minimum wages. In
each case, the court upheld the state laws after determining that the
issue was an issue of statewide concern and that the legislature had a
75. Morial,785 So. 2d 1.
76. Polk, 626 So. 2d 1128.
77. One exception to this pattern is City ofNew Orleansv. BoardofDirectors,
739 So. 2d 748 (La. 1999), which overturned a municipal decision to deny a zoning
permit to the state museum even without an express statute exempting it from local
ordinances. One might, however, find a conflict with the state legislation
appropriating funds for the improvements to the museum.
78. New OrleansCampaignfor a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1109 (Calogero,
C.J., concurring in the judgment).
79. City ofNew Orleans,640 So. 2d at 252 (emphasis added).

80. Id.
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reasonable basis for its policy choice. 8 In neither case did the court
require the state to demonstrate that the state legislation was
"necessary;" that is, that the state had no alternatives that would
achieve its goal with less impact on local governments. Instead, the
court's recent decisions show a willingness to defer to the state in
conflicts with local governments, at least when the legislation
involves a legitimate matter of statewide concern and some evidence
supports the legislature's decision.
Despite the shift in analysis in the recent decisions, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has not rendered the home rule provisions ofthe 1974
Constitution inconsequential.8 2 For one thing, Francisstill indicates
that the court will enforce the ban in Section 6 against state laws that
interfere with the "structure and organization" of local governments
with home rule charters. Even more importantly, the court has
consistently affirmed that parishes and municipalities with home rule
charters have broad authority in areas where no state law exists.83
Indeed, the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Calogero 4 and
Justice Weimer 85 are the first attempts to articulate a general limit on
local authority even when the state legislature has not acted. Unlike
the police power provision ofArticle VI, Section 9(B), the limitations
of Section 9(A) do not require state legislation to limit local authority.
To the contrary, Section 9(A) absolutely prohibits local laws that
define felonies; and it permits local ordinances "affecting private or
civil relationships" only if the legislature authorizes them. Thus, if
the Chief Justice or Justice Weimer can persuade a majority of the
court to construe the term "private or civil relationships" broadly in
the future, that approach would impose a significant limit on the
authority of local governments even when the state has not acted.
B. Location of Gaming Activities
The issue in the riverboat gaming case, Cameron ParishPolice
Jury v. McKeithen, was one of statutory construction rather than
constitutional power. For many years, the Louisiana Supreme Court
has construed the legislature's power to define and suppress gambling
81. See, e.g., New Orleans Campaignfor a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1107;
Morial, 785 So. 2d at 18-19.
82. For a more critical assessment of the Supreme Court decision in New Orleans
Campaignfor a Living Wage, see Recent Developments,New Orleans Campaign for
a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans: State Police Power Swallows up
ConstitutionalHome Rule in Louisiana,77 Tul. L. Rev. 1129 (2003).
83. See, e.g., New Orleans Campaignfor a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1107;
Morial,785 So. 2d at 16; Francis,455 So. 2d at 1171.
84. See supranote 59.
85. Id.
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as an exclusive one that excludes local supplementation. 86 The
Cameron Parish Police Jury did not challenge that constitutional
principle. Instead, the police jury argued that the existing state law
allowed it to call an election to designate a waterway as one on which
riverboat gaming is permitted.
The 1974 Constitution continued a longstanding mandate that the
legislature define and suppress gambling. 87 Notwithstanding this
mandate, the Louisiana Supreme Court has sustained legislation that
allows "gaming" activities. 88 A constitutional amendment in 1986
specifically authorized a state lottery, 89 but other amendments have
generally required approval of other gaming activities by the voters
in the parish where the activity will take place.9"
To implement the constitutional requirement for local approval
for riverboat gaming, the legislature enacted La. R.S. 27:43. 91
86. See, e.g., Polk, 626 So. 2d 1128; City of Shreveport v. Kaufinan, 353 So. 2d
995 (La. 1977), analyzedin Murchison, The Work ofthe LouisianaAppellate Courts
for the 1977-1978 Term-LocalGovernmentLaw, 39 La. L. Rev. 843, 853-57 (1979);
City of Alexandria v. La Combe, 220 La. 618, 57 So. 2d 206 (1952); see generally
Note, Home Rule and Local OrdinancesDefining Gambling, 38 La. L. Rev. 1108
(1978). Prior to the Kaufman decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld local
ordinances that punished gambling ifthey did not go beyond the state definition. See,
e.g., City of Lake Charles v. Marcantel, 125 La. 70, 51 So. 106 (1910).
87. La. Const. art. XII, § 6, as amended, § 6(B) (1990).
88. See, e.g., Polk, 626 So. 2d 1128 (including casinos); Gandolfo v. Louisiana
State Racing Comm'n, 227 La. 45, 78 So. 2d 504 (1954) (including racetracks).
89. La. Const. art. 12, § 6(A) (1990), as amended, (2003).
90. Id. § (C) (1996).
91. La. R.S. 27:43 provides:
A. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the
conducting of gaming activities on a riverboat in accordance with the
provisions of this Chapter, while upon designated rivers or waterways as
described in Subsection B of this Section, is hereby authorized.
B. (1) For purposes of this Chapter, designated rivers and waterways shall
include those portions of the Mississippi, Red, except the portion of the Red
River within the borders of Rapides Parish, Calcasieu, Mermentau, or
Atchafalaya Rivers and Bayou Segnette within the city limits of Westwego,
the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, Bayou Bienvenue, Lake Pontchartrain,
Lake Maurepas, Lake Charles, the Intracoastal Waterway, except the portion
thereof within the borders of Terrebonne and Lafourche Parishes, and the
Sabine River north of the Toledo Bend Reservoir Dam subject to the
provisions of Paragraph (2) of this Subsection, upon which a gaming
operator is authorized to conduct gaming operations in accordance with the
provisions ofthis Chapter.
(2) (a) On and after June 20, 1995, the addition of a designated river or
waterway to those listed in Paragraph (1) of this Subsection shall be
effective only after approval by voters in an election held, pursuant to this
Paragraph, in any parish which borders the proposed river's or waterway's
banks. Such election shall permit voters in such parishes to decide the
question of whether the berthing of a riverboat upon which gaming is
conducted on such river or waterway shall be authorized.
(b)(i) At any time after the inclusion of a river or waterway has been
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Subsection A authorizes riverboat gaming activities "in accordance
with the provisions of [the Louisiana Riverboat Economic
Development and Gaming Control Act], while upon designated rivers
or waterways as described in Subsection B." Subsection B, in turn,
consists of two paragraphs.92 Paragraph (1) enumerates specific
waterways that the term "designated rivers and waterways shall
include." Paragraph (2) contains three provisions. Subparagraph (a)
limits additions to the list of designated rivers and waterways "after
June 20, 1995." It provides that any such addition "shall be effective
only after approval by voters in an election held pursuant to this
Paragraph in any parish which borders the proposed river's or
waterway's banks... to decide the question of whether the berthing
of a riverboat upon which gaming is conducted on such river or
waterway shall be authorized." Item (i) of Subparagraph (b) allows
the governing authority to order an election "[alt any time after the
inclusion ofa riveror waterway has been proposedby an act of the
legislature." Item (ii) declares that, if the results in the election are
favorable, "the river or waterway proposed by an act of the
legislatureshall be considered a designated river or waterway. The
list of designated waterways in La. R.S. 27:43 does not include the
proposed by an act of the legislature, the governing authority of any parish
which borders the proposed river's or waterways banks may order, by
resolution, an election to permit voters in such parish to decide the question
of whether the berthing of a riverboat upon which gaming is conducted on
such river or waterway shall be authorized. Such election shall be held
pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 6-B of Title 18 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes of 1950.
(ii) If such an election has occurred in any parish which borders the banks of
a proposed river or waterway and the results in any such election have been
favorable, then immediately upon promulgation ofthe election results in any
such parish, the river or waterway proposed by an act of the legislature shall
be considered a designated river or waterway.
C. (1) For the purposes of this Section, the Intracoastal Waterway shall be
deemed to include all of Bayou Boeuf within, or which forms the border of,
St. Mary Parish, including that portion of Bayou Boeuf in St. Mary Parish
historically described by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration as the Morgan City to Port Allen Landside Route of the
Intracoastal Waterway.
(2) This Subsection is expressly declared to be a clarification of the law.
The provisions of this Subsection shall not be construed to add a designated
river or waterway to those enumerated in Subsection B of this Section or to
require the holding of an election or elections pursuant to Subsection B of
this Section.
92. The denomination of the subdivisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 27:43
follows the legislative drafting rules. "Generally speaking, on the Revised Statutes,
use numbered Sections divided into uppercase alphabetical subsections, divided into
numbered Paragraphs, divided into lowercase alphabetical Subparagraphs, divided
into lower case Roman numeral Items, divided into lowercase (double letters)
alphabetical Sub Items." La. House Legislative Services, Drafting Style and Usage
Manual 37 (Sept. 2000).
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Sabine River or Sabine Lake. Nonetheless, the Cameron Parish
Police Jury called an election to designate portions of the river and
lake "'a designated river or waterway for the conducting of gaming
activities on a riverboat' and to authorize berthing ofa riverboat upon
which gaming is conducted."93
A legislator representing Cameron Parish requested an opinion
from the Attorney General on the legality ofthe election. In response,
the policejury and an individual voter and taxpayer in the parish filed
suit to force the secretary of state to take all necessary steps to place
the proposition on the ballot for the November 2002 general
election.94 After the third circuit ordered the case transferred to East
Baton Rouge Parish,95 the trial court granted the injunctive relief
requested by the plaintiffs. However, the first circuit reversed the
trial judge and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs.
The plaintiffs argued that the legislature had delegated control
over whether riverboat gaming should be allowed to the voters of the
parish. In particular, they relied on La. R.S. 27:43B(2)(a). That
section, they claimed, allows any parish which borders "the proposed
river's or waterway's banks" to determine "whether the berthing of
a riverboat upon which gaming is conducted on such river or
waterway shall be authorized."
The first circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument as inconsistent
with Section 43 considered in its entirety.96 Subsection B(2)(a), the
provision on which the plaintiffs relied, only allowed the voters to
authorize riverboat gaming on a waterway after an election "held
pursuant to this Paragraph." The paragraph to which the subsection
refers is Paragraph 2 of Subsection B of Section 43, and Item (i) of
Subparagraph (b) of that paragraph only allows the parish governing
body to call an election "after the inclusion ofa river or waterway has
been proposed by an act of the legislature." In light of this
subparagraph, "a local referendum pursuant to [Paragraph 2 of
Subsection B] can be held only after the legislature has designated the
river or waterway as one upon which
a gaming operator is authorized
9' 7
to conduct gaming operations.
The Cameron Parish Police Jury had called the election without
a prior designation of the waterway by the legislature. Thus, its
action was "illegal and invalid" and an attempt to "usurp the
legislature's constitutional duty to define and suppress gambling."
93. Cameron Parish Police Jury v. McKeithen, 836 So. 2d 181, 183 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2002).
94. Id.
95. Cameron Parish Police Jury v. McKeithen, 827 So. 2d 666 (La. App. 3d Cir.
2002).
96. See supranote 91 for the text of La. R.S. 27:43.
97. Cameron ParishPoliceJury,836 So. 2d. at 184 (emphasis in original).
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Because the propositions were illegal, the secretary of state had no
duty to place them on the election ballot. Accordingly, the court of
appeal reversed the judgment of the lower court and dissolved the
injunction it had issued.
The first circuit's construction of La. R.S. 27:43 is a convincing
one. It considers the entire text of the section to reject a strained
interpretation of an isolated phrase. The decision is also consistent
with the broad pattern of decisions interpreting the constitutional
provisions regarding gambling and gaming. The Louisiana Supreme
Court has consistently held that the mandate that the legislature define
and suppress gambling not only obligates the state to act, but
precludes local governments from supplementing the state legislation.
The recent constitutional and statutory amendments do not reverse
this general allocation of power. Instead, they grant local voters a
limited authority to veto gaming activities that the legislature has
authorized.
11. CONCLUSION

Neither New OrleansCampaignfor a Living Wage nor Calcasieu
ParishPolice Jury breaks new ground. Nonetheless, the decisions
provide important confirmation of general themes regarding the
powers of local governments. First, the Louisiana Supreme Court
continues to interpret Section 9(B) of Article VI as a broad
reservation of the state's police power. When regulatory statutes
directly conflict with ordinances of local governments, the court has
consistently upheld the state legislation. Moreover, it has-in recent
cases-limited its review ofthe validity of the state's police power to
an examination of whether the legislature has made a "reasoned
policy choice;" if the legislature has made such a choice, the courts
should not "second-guess[]" it.98 Second, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has consistently required state authorizations for gaming and
other activities that might fall within the legislative duty to define and
to suppress gambling. Following this line of decisions, the first
circuit rejected a strained interpretation of La. R.S. 27:43, an
interpretation that would have permitted a local government to
approve riverboat gaming on a waterway without securing a
legislative designation of the waterway as one on which riverboat
gaming is permitted.

98.

New OrleansCampaignfor a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1106.

